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I. INTRODUCTION
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission1 the Supreme Court, applying
heightened scrutiny, 2 held that the California Coastal Commission could not
constitutionally condition issuance of a building permit on a requirement that
the owners of a beachfront lot grant an uncompensated public access easement
1. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
2. The Court held that the Commission did not prove that the land-use regulation at issue "substantially
advanced" a legitimate state interest. Under rational basis review, the Nollans would have been required
to prove that the Commission had no rational basis for its action. See infra notes 174-93 and accompanying text.
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across their beach. Since there was no "essential nexus" 3 between the burden
on visual access to the beach created by the Nollans' new house and the lateral
access easement imposed by the Commission in an attempt to alleviate that bur-
den, the Court held that the Commission could obtain the easement only by
using its eminent domain power.4 The Court's use of heightened scrutiny to
review the Commission's action is justified by the importance of the traditional
common-law right of property owners to exclude others 5 and is necessary to
prevent use of the police power in an attempt to avoid the constitutional re-




James and Marilyn Nollan leased, with an option to buy, a beachfront lot
and bungalow in Ventura County, California. 7 The Nollans' option to purchase
had been conditioned on their promise to demolish and replace the 504 square-
foot bungalow, which the Nollans had rented to summer vacationers until it
deteriorated and became unsuitable for rental. 8 In order to fulfill the condition
on their option to purchase, the Nollans applied to the California Coastal Com-
mission for a permit 9 which would allow them to demolish the bungalow and
replace it with a three-bedroom house similar to others in the area. 10 The Com-
mission issued the permit subject to the Nollans' recordation of a deed restric-
tion granting a public easement across their beach. 11
Seeking invalidation of the easement condition, the Nollans filed a petition
3. Nollan. 107 S. Ct. at 3148.
4. Id. at 3148, 3150. Eminent domain is the power of government to condemn private property for
public use, with payment of just compensation for the deprivation. United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253,
255-58 (1980).
5. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) ("ITlhe 'right to exclude,'
so universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right, falls within [that] category of interests
that the Government cannot take without compensation.").
6. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
7. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3143. The beach is separated from the remainder of the lot by an eight-foot
high concrete seawall. Id.
8. Id. The bungalow did not meet many building, health, and safety code standards. It was located
in a neighborhood containing newer, larger homes; and it was an "eyesore and a nuisance" due to its deterio-
rated condition and small size. Jurisdictional Statement at 5, Nollan.
9. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 30212 (West 1986) requires dedication of access along the beach when
construction, repair, or improvement activity occurs on private property between the last public road and
the ocean, except where "adequate access exists nearby." Faria County Park, an oceanside public park with
public beach and recreation area, is located one-fourth of a mile north of the Nollans' lot. Another public
beach is located 1800 feet south of their lot. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3143.
10. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3143. The Nollans planned to replace the one-story bungalow with a "two-
story, three-bedroom, 1674 square foot residence with attached two car garage"; and they intended to oc-
cupy the new residence permanently. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 177 Cal. App. 3d 719, 721,
223 Cal. Rptr. 28, 29 (1986).
11. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3143. The easement covered the portion of the Nollans' property bounded
by the mean high tide line on one side and their seawall on the other side. Id. The Nollans' lot is 3800 square
feet in size; the easement was to be over approximately one-third of the lot. Jurisdictional Statement at 4, 6.
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for writ of administrative mandamus in Ventura County Superior Court. 12 The
Superior Court remanded the case to the Commission for a full evidentiary hear-
ing to determine whether the Nollans' new home would adversely affect public
access to the beach. 13 The Commission held a public hearing, after which it
reaffirmed its imposition of the access condition. 14 The Commission found that
the Nollans' new house would further block visual access to the ocean and would
prevent the public "'psychologically ...from realizing a stretch of coastline
exists nearby that they have every right to visit."' 15
The Nollans filed a supplemental petition for writ of administrative manda-
mus in Ventura County Superior Court, arguing that the easement violated the
takings clause. 16 The Superior Court granted the writ of mandamus and direct-
ed the Commission to strike the permit condition, holding that the Commission
had no authority to impose public access conditions on coastal development per-
mits unless the proposed development would have an "adverse impact on pub-
lic access to the sea."
17
During the pendency of the Commission's appeal to the California Court of
Appeal, the Nollans, in order to satisfy the condition in their purchase option,
demolished the bungalow, built the new house, and bought the property. '8 The
Court of Appeal, reversing the Superior Court, held that the Coastal Act re-
quired that an access condition be imposed whenever a coastal permit was granted
for construction of a new house whose floor area, height, or bulk was more
than ten percent larger than the structure it replaced. 19 The Court of Appeal
held that a direct burden on public access did not need to be demonstrated and
that there need be "only an indirect relationship between an exaction and [the]
need to which the project contributes." 20 The Nollans' taking claim was reject-
ed because the easement did not deprive them of the use of their lot, but only
diminished its value. 21 The California Supreme Court denied the Nollans' peti-
tion for review,22 and the Nollans appealed to the United States Supreme Court. 2
12. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3143.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 3143-44 (quoting Record, App. 58). The Commission found that "[t]he visiting public, look-
ing for an overall beach resource experience, would be discouraged from using the beachfront or the Faria
Beach Park due to the impacting nature of residential development along the shoreline." Jurisdictional State-
ment, App. E, at E-42.
16. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3144.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 177 Cal. App. 3d 719, 724, 223 Cal. Rptr. 28, 31 (1986).
20. Id. at 723, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 30.
21. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3144.
22. Jurisdictional Statement at 2.
23. The Court noted probable jurisdiction. 107 S. Ct. 312 (1986).
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I. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
The Court has frequently drawn a distinction between "regulatory" takings,
which involve restrictions on the use of property, and "traditional" takings, which
involve actual appropriation, invasion, or occupation of property. 24 The Califor-
nia Coastal Commission attempted to exercise its police power to regulate land
use, but the easement condition imposed by the Commission resulted in "per-
manent physical occupation" of the Nollans' property. 25 Nollan, therefore, con-
tains elements of both "regulatory" and "traditional" takings analysis.
In 1978 the Court held that three factors are important in determining whether
restrictions on the use of property effect a taking and require payment of just
compensation: (1) the character of the government's action; (2) the economic
impact of the regulation; and (3) the extent to which the regulation interferes
with investment-backed expectations. 26 In 1982 the Court held that a perma-
nent physical occupation is "a taking to the extent of the occupation, without
regard to whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has only
minimal economic impact on the owner." 27
In Nollan the Court made it clear that, when the character of the governmen-
tal action is a permanent physical occupation of private property imposed as
a condition to the lifting of a restriction on its use, the question of whether a
taking has occurred is not to be answered using the economic analysis described
in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City. Instead, the proper ques-
tion is: does the regulation substantially advance a legitimate state interest? 28
The Nollan Court's resolution of the apparent conflict between Penn Central
and Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., as well as its precise ar-
ticulation of the standard of review, 29 provides a level of predictability and cer-
24. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1244 n.18 (1987)
("While the Court has almost invariably found that the permanent physical occupation of property consti-
tutes a taking, . . . the Court has repeatedly upheld regulations that destroy or adversely affect real property
interests"); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436 (1982) ("occupation is
qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property"); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) ("A 'taking' may more readily be found when the interference with property
can be characterized as a physical invasion by government . . . than when interference arises from some
public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good").
25. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3145. Cf Loretto, 458 U.S. at 433, in which the Court said that the public
access easement at issue in Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), discussed infra notes 104-09
and accompanying text, was "not ... a permanent occupation of land."
26. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
27. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434-35. The Court affirmed "the traditional rule that a permanent physical oc-
cupation of property is a taking, [but did not] question . . . a State's broad power to impose appropriate
restrictions upon an owner's use of his property." Id. at 441.
28. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3146.
29. As the opinions in Nollan demonstrate, the Court's previous decisions have been far from clear in
articulating the standard of review for takings challenges. See Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3146-47 & n.3; 3151-52
& n. 1 (Brennan, J., dissenting); 3162-63 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also infra notes 174-93 and accom-
panying text.
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tainty in takings clause jurisprudence which has previously been absent. 30
The first factor of the Penn Central test, the "character of the governmental
action," 31 seems to be the most critical one in determining whether just com-
pensation is required. 32 When the governmental action merely interferes with
the use of property, the economic impact of the regulation and its interference
with investment-backed expectations are considered in light of the owner's al-
ternative uses of the property. 33 But, when the regulation involves physical oc-
cupation of the property by a third party, the economic impact of the government's
action on the owner is irrelevant. 31 Permanent physical occupations of land "are
takings even if they occupy only relatively insubstantial amounts of space and
do not seriously interfere with the landowner's use of the rest of his land."
35
In contrast, with respect to restrictions on use, "'[tfaking' jurisprudence does
not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether
rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated."3 6
The Court's distinction between physical occupation and restrictions on the
use of property has been criticized on the ground that many restrictions "may
30. Justice Stevens claimed that "[e]ven the wisest lawyers would have to acknowledge great uncertainty
about the scope of this Court's takings jurisprudence." Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3163 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The Court has referred to the lack of any "'set formula' to determine where regulation ends and taking be-
gins," Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962), and has stated that "whether a particular
restriction will be rendered invalid by the government's failure to pay for any losses proximately caused
by it depends largely 'upon the particular circumstances [in that] case.'" Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (quoting United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155,
168 (1958)). See also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S.
51, 65 (1979); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
31. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. In Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426, the Court held that in cases of perma-
nent physical occupation this factor "not only is ... important . in resolving whether the action works
a taking but also is determinative."
32. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1244 n. 18 (1987) ("the type
of taking alleged is . .. an often critical factor").
33. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. The Court is reluctant "to find a taking when the state merely res-
trains uses of property that are tantamount to public nuisances." Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1245. In Andrus
v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979), the Court rejected a challenge by a trader of Indian artifacts to the Eagle
Protection Act and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act. Although the Acts prohibited sale of artifacts he owned
prior to the passage of the Acts, the Court stated that it was not clear that he would "be unable to derive
economic benefit," perhaps by displaying the artifacts and charging admission. Id. at 66. It was "crucial
[that the Acts did not] compel the surrender of the artifacts, and [that] there [was] no physical invasion or
restraint upon them." Id. at 65.
34. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434-35. Regulations which do not involve physical occupation of property "will
be analyzed under the multifactor inquiry generally applicable to nonpossessory governmental activity." Id.
at 440 (citing Penn Central). See also United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266 (1946) (quoting United
States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 328 (1917)) ("'the character of the invasion, not the amount of damage resulting
from it .... determines the question whether it is a taking' ").
35. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 430. The size of the area occupied is relevant only "in determining the compen-
sation due." Id. at 436-37.
36. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130. See also Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1248 ("our test for regulatory tak-
ing requires us to compare the value that has been taken from the property with the value that remains in
the property"); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979) ("the destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle is
not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety"); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393, 419 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("If we are to consider the value of the coal kept in place
by the restriction, we should compare it with the value of. . . the whole property").
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diminish the value of private property far more than minor physical touchings." 37
While it is undoubtedly true that some physical invasions may cause less monetary
damage than use restrictions,38 "[t]he power to exclude has traditionally been
considered one of the most treasured strands in an owner's bundle of property
rights." 39 The takings clause justifies the traditional expectation of private
property owners that they have the right to exclude others from their property
and that, when government takes that right from them, they will be compensat-
ed,40 regardless of the size of the area taken or the value of the remaining por-
tion of their property.41
Furthermore, the distinction between use restrictions and physical occupa-
tions offers the advantages of certainty and predictability. While state agencies
and land-use planners may find it difficult to evaluate, in advance, the econom-
ic impact of their actions, they should have little difficulty deciding whether
their plans will involve physical occupation of property. As the Court has pointed
out, "whether a permanent physical occupation has occurred presents relative-
ly few problems of proof. . . [and] is an obvious fact that will rarely be sub-
ject to dispute." 42
37. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 447 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also Michelman, Property, Utility, and
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of"Just Compensation"Law, 80 HARV. L. Rv. 1165, 1227
(1967) ("its capacity to distinguish, even crudely, between significant and insignificant losses is too puny
to be taken seriously").
38. For example, in Loretto the Court held that the owner was entitled to compensation for a physical
occupation consisting of "only about one-eighth of a cubic foot of space on the roof of [Loretto's] Manhattan
apartment building." 458 U.S. at 443 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In contrast, the Court held that Penn Cen-
tral was not entitled to compensation for deprivation of the use of the airspace above its terminal building,
resulting in its loss of a minimum of three million dollars in annual rentals from the office building proposed
for the site. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 116.
39. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435.
40. See, e.g., id. at 441 (in cases of permanent physical occupation of property, "the property owner
entertains a historically rooted expectation of compensation"). In Loretto the Court explained that "temporary
limitations are subject to a more complex balancing process to determine whether they are a taking ... [be-
cause] they do not absolutely dispossess the owner of his rights to use, and exclude others from, his property."
458 U.S. at 435. See generally R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY
410-11 (1984) and authorities cited therein ("the right physically to exclude others is the most nearly abso-
lute of the many property rights that flow from the ownership or other rightful possession of land").
41. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436-37 ("constitutional protection for the rights of private property cannot be
made to depend on the size of the area permanently occupied").
42. Id. at 437. When title and the right to exclusive possession are retained by the owner, situations
in which the property cannot be used for some conceivable purpose are rare. See, e.g., Andrus v. Allard,
444 U.S. at 66, where the Court suggested that, even though the owner was denied the most profitable use
of his artifacts, i.e., the right to sell them, he might exhibit them and charge admission. The situation in
Pennsylvania Coal, discussed infra notes 76-84, is one of those rare occasions. The deprivation of all use
of property, as alleged in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S.
Ct. 2378 (1987), might be another; but the Court did not decide that issue. See infra notes 67-75 and accom-
panying text.
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A. "Regulatory" Takings: Land-Use Regulation
1. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City
43
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, held that New York City's Land-
marks Preservation Law did not effect a taking of private property requiring
payment of just compensation. ' Penn Central, whose plans to construct an office
tower above Grand Central Terminal had been rejected, claimed that the Land-
marks Law, as applied, violated the due process clause and constituted a taking
without just compensation. 4 The New York Court of Appeals rejected the claim
that Penn Central's air space above its terminal had been taken without just com-
pensation, holding that such a taking could not occur since the law merely res-
tricted the use of the property but did not transfer control of it.
4, 6
The Court summarized "taking" jurisprudence, indicating that the following
factors are significant in the determination of whether a taking has occurred:
The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly,
the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-
backed expectations are relevant considerations.. . . So, too, is the character
of the governmental action. A "taking" may more readily be found when
the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion
by government ... than when interference arises from some public pro-
gram adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the
common good. 47
43. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
44. Id. at 138.
45. Id. at 119. Penn Central conceded the legitimacy of the goal of landmark preservation and the ap-
propriateness of the restrictions as a means to secure that goal, but it sought just compensation for the depri-
vation of use of the airspace above its property. Id. at 129.
46. Id. at 120-21. The Court of Appeals held that there was no denial of due process since Penn Central
could continue to use its property and earn a reasonable return on the use. Id. In Williamson County Region-
al Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), the Planning Commission argued that "government
regulation does not effect a taking for which the Fifth Amendment requires just compensation; instead, regu-
lation that goes so far that it has the same effect as a taking by eminent domain is an invalid exercise of
the police power, violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 197. According
to this theory, which the Court recently rejected in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County
of Los Angeles, discussed infra notes 67-75 and accompanying text, invalidation of the regulation and, if
appropriate, actual damages - and not "just compensation" - is the remedy for a violation of the due process
clause. Although the Court did not reach this issue, it made the following comment regarding this argument:
Viewing a regulation that "goes too far" as an invalid exercise of the police power, rather
than as a "taking" for which just compensation must be paid, does not resolve the difficult
problem of how to define "too far," that is, how to distinguish the point at which regulation
becomes so onerous that it has the same effect as an appropriation of the property through
eminent domain or physical possession.
Williamson County. 473 U.S. at 199-
47. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. In Bowen v. Gilliard, 107 S. Ct. 3008 (1987), the Court held that
assignment of the right to receive child support payments to the State, as required by the statute authorizing
Federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children, did not effect a taking of property without just compensa-
tion. Id. at 3020-21. The Court concluded that the economic impact on the child's right to receive exclusive
benefit from the support payments was not substantial; the child had no vested expectations regarding future
support payments; and the character of the government's action "[did] not implicate the type of concerns
that the takings clause protects." Id.
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The Court focused "both on the character of the action and on the nature and
extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole" 48 in deciding
whether there had been a taking. After deciding that the Landmarks Law was
facially valid even though it did not provide just compensation for restrictions
on "exploitation of property interests," 49 the Court next addressed the issue of
whether the Landmarks Law, as applied, interfered with Penn Central's use of
its property to an extent requiring an exercise of eminent domain and compen-
sation. 50 Since Penn Central suffered no interference with its present use of
the property and since Penn Central had "transferable-development rights" 1
which would allow it to construct its proposed office building elsewhere, the
Court concluded that the "restrictions imposed [were] substantially related to
the promotion of the general welfare." 2
2. Zoning Ordinances
Comprehensive zoning laws and ordinances are constitutional unless they are
"clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare."5 3 The justification for a zoning or-
dinance must be found "in some aspect of the police power, asserted for the
public welfare;"54 and "the legislative judgment must be allowed to control [if
its validity is] fairly debatable." 55
An ordinance requiring buildings to be set back a certain distance from the
street was upheld in Gorieb v. Fox. 56 The Court explained that, since local
48. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31. The Court recognized that "a use restriction on real property
may constitute a 'taking' if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public purpose, . . .
or perhaps if it has an unduly harsh impact upon the owner's use of the property." Id. at 127. The Court
also noted that "government actions that may be characterized as acquisitions of resources to permit or facili-
tate uniquely public functions have often been held to constitute takings.' "Id. at 128. The Court cited Unit-
ed States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) as an illustration of such a government action. In Causby, discussed
infra note 109, the Court held that frequent low-altitude military flights over a chicken farm were invasions
of the property which entitled the owner to compensation for the diminution in the value of the land.
49. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136.
50. Id. (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)).
51. Id. at 137. Under New York City zoning laws, Penn Central's rights to develop the air space above
its terminal are transferable to other property in the vicinity. Id. The Court did not decide whether these
rights would have satisfied the just compensation requirement had a taking occurred. Id.
52. Id. at 138. The Court emphasized that its holding was "based on Penn Central's present ability to
use the Terminal for its intended purposes and in a gainful fashion." Id. at 138 n.36.
53. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926). Accord, Gorieb v. Fox, 274
U.S. 603, 610 (1927).
54. Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387. The police power "is not capable of precise delimitation, [but)
varies with circumstances and conditions." Id. The Court referred to nuisance law as a helpful analogy for
"ascertaining the scope of. . . the power." Id. at 387-88.
55. Id. at 388. The Court distinguished a facial challenge from one challenging specific provisions in
their application to particular property, pointing out the possibility that, "if attacked separately, [they] might
not withstand the test of constitutionality." Id. at 395.
56. 274 U.S. 603, 604 (1927). Since the property owner had been granted a variance, the ordinance,
as applied, did not violate the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. Id.
at 605, 606.
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governing authorities are "better qualified than the courts to determine the neces-
sity, character and degree of regulation [required by complex urban problems,]
their conclusions should not be disturbed by the courts unless clearly arbitrary
and unreasonable."
57
The Court rejected a challenge by the owner of a sand and gravel excavation
business to an ordinance regulating dredging and pit excavation in Goldblatt
v. Town of Hempstead. 51 Despite the fact that "the ordinance completely pro-
hibit[ed] a beneficial use to which the property ha[d] previously been devot-
ed,"59 there was no evidence indicating that the mining prohibition would reduce
the value of the property. 60 Therefore, the issue was whether the prohibition
was a valid exercise of the police power. .6 The prohibition was justified for
two reasons: " 'the interests of the public ... require such interference; and, ...
the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals.'
6 2
A facial challenge to city zoning ordinances was rejected in Agins v. City
of Tiburon .6 3 The zoning ordinances did not effect a taking because they "sub-
stantially advance[d] legitimate government goals [and were] exercises of the
city's police power to protect the residents of Tiburon from the ill effects of
urbanization."6 Although the zoning ordinances limited the extent of allowa-
ble development, the land owners would be permitted to build five houses on
the five acres of property and thus were "free to pursue their reasonable invest-
ment expectations by submitting a development plan to local officials." 65 In as-
sessing the validity of the ordinances, the Court balanced the benefits to the
developers "in assuring careful and orderly development of residential property
57. Id. at 608. An ordinance which zoned property located between residential and industrial areas as
residential was held unconstitutional, as applied, in Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 186 (1928).
As a result of the enactment of the ordinance, an individual who had contracted to purchase the property
refused to comply with the contract. Id. at 187. The Court's holding was based upon the finding of a master
that the zoning of the land as residential would not promote "the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare." Id. at 188.
58. 369 U.S. 590, 591 (1962). The owners claimed that the ordinance prevented continuation of their
business and therefore took their property without due process of law.
59. Id. at 592.
60. Id. at 594.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 595 (quoting Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894)). Despite the Court's statement
that "'debatable questions as to reasonableness are not for the courts but for the legislature,'" id. at 595
(quoting Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 388 (1932)), it nevertheless undertook an evaluation of the reasona-
bleness of the ordinance, stating that "the nature of the menace against which it will protect, the availability
and effectiveness of other less drastic protective steps, and the loss which [the property owner] will suffer"
were necessary to such an evaluation. Id. at 595. Since the evidence on these points was indecisive, the
Court held that the property owners had not met their burden of showing that the ordinance was an unreasonable
exercise of the police power. Id. at 595-96.
63. 447 U.S. 255, 259 (1980). The owners claimed that the city had taken their property without just
compensation because the zoning ordinances had completely destroyed the value of their property and prevented
its development for residential use. Id. at 258.
64. Id. at 261. This is the standard of review applied in Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3146.
65. Agins, 447 U.S. at 262.
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with provision for open-space areas"6 against the reduction in the value of their
property.
3. Temporary Regulatory Takings
In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 
6 7
the Court held that just compensation is available for a temporary regulatory
taking, i.e., for the period between the time property is allegedly taken and
the time of final determination that the regulation effects a taking. " The Church
operated a campground which was destroyed in a flood following a forest fire;
after the flood the County adopted an ordinance prohibiting construction in a
designated area which included the Church's property.69 The California Court
of Appeal held that the Church's inverse condemnation 70 claim seeking damages
for loss of use of the property could not be maintained until the challenged regu-
lation had first been held excessive in an action for declaratory relief or a writ
of mandamus and affirmed the Superior Court's decision to strike the claim. 71
The Court did not decide whether there had been a taking 72 but held that,
when a regulatory taking has occurred, "no subsequent action by the govern-
ment can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period during
which the taking was effective."73 The Court limited its holding to the facts
presented and emphasized that governments have several options once a deter-
mination is made that a taking has occurred: "amendment of the regulation,
withdrawal of the invalidated regulation, or exercise of eminent domain."
74
Although the Court recognized that its decision requiring compensation for the
temporary taking, regardless of which of these options the government chooses,
would limit the flexibility available to land-use planners, it reaffirmed that "'a
strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant
66. Id. Since the Court held that there was no taking, it did not consider the California Supreme Court's
holding that an inverse condemnation proceeding could not be maintained for a regulatory taking. Id. at 263.
67. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
68. Id. at 2381. In Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172
(1985), the Court held that this issue was not ripe for review because the subdivision developer challenging
the zoning ordinances at issue had neither obtained a final decision regarding application of the ordinances
nor pursued state procedures for obtaining just compensation. Id. at 186. This issue was also unripe for
decision in MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 106 S. Ct. 2561, 2566 (1986); San Diego Gas
& Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 633 (1981); and Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S.
255, 263 (1980).
69. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2381-82.
70. Inverse condemnation is "a shorthand description of the manner in which a landowner recovers just
compensation for a taking of his property when condemnation proceedings have not been instituted." United
States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980).
71. First English, 107 S. Ct. 2382.
72. Id. at 2384-85. The Court stated: "We ... have no occasion to decide .. whether the county might
avoid the conclusion that a compensable taking had occurred by establishing that the denial of all use was
insulated as a part of the State's authority to enact safety regulations." Id.
73. Id. at 2389.
74. Id.
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achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for
the change."' 75
4. Other Restrictions on Use of Property
In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 76 owners of a house located on land
above a coal mine sought an injunction to prevent Pennsylvania Coal Company
from mining underneath their home. They claimed that the Kohler Act, which
forbade mining resulting in subsidence," prevented the coal company from con-
tinuing to mine the coal underneath their house, even though their deed specifi-
cally provided otherwise. 78 The Court, in an opinion by Justice Holmes, assumed
that the Kohler Act was intended to achieve a legitimate public purpose which
would justify an exercise of eminent domain but held that the Act, as applied
to property to which the right to mine coal had been previously reserved, was
not a valid exercise of the police power. 79
Justice Holmes recognized that property interests are impliedly limited by
the police power but stated that "obviously the implied limitation must have
its limits, or the contract and due process clauses are gone." 80 He warned that
"[w]hen [the] seemingly absolute protection [of the just compensation clause]
is found to be qualified by the police power, the natural tendency of human
nature is to extend the qualification more and more until at last private property
disappears."81 The extent of diminution in value is one factor to be considered
in determining the limits of the police power, and "[w]hen it reaches a certain
magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent do-
main and compensation to sustain the act."82 The police power exercised by
the state in the Kohler Act in Pennsylvania Coal went "too far" 83 because it
made mining of certain coal commercially impracticable and took away the right
to mine coal in situations where that right had been expressly reserved. 8
The Court dealt with a similar factual situation in Keystone Bituminous Coal
75. Id. (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 416).
76. 260 U.S. 393, 412 (1922).
77. "Coal mine subsidence is the lowering of strata overlying a coal mine, including the land surface,
caused by the extraction of underground coal. This lowering of the strata ... often causes substantial damage
to foundations, walls, ...and the integrity of houses and buildings." Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1236-37 (1987).
78. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 412-13.
79. Id. at 414, 416. According to Justice Holmes, "It]he protection of private property in the Fifth Amend-
ment presupposes that it is wanted for public use, but provides that it shall not be taken for such use without
compensation." Id. at 415.
80. Id. at 413.
81. Id. at 415.
82. Id. at 413. "IT]he question depends upon the particular facts," id., and "cannot be disposed of by
general propositions." Id. at 416.
83. Id. at 415.
84. Id. at 414.
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Association v. DeBenedictis. 8 5 Keystone claimed that mining prohibitions autho-
rized by the Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act com-
pletely destroyed its property interests in the support estate. 88 The Court
distinguished Pennsylvania Coal by pointing out that the Subsidence Act, un-
like the Kohler Act in Pennsylvania Coal, was enacted to prevent threatened
harm to the public welfare. 8 7 Since Keystone introduced no evidence that its
mining operations had been or would be unprofitable and the regulatory tak-
ings test in a facial challenge such as this one required a comparison of "the
value that has been taken from the property with the value that remains in the
property,"88 the Court held that the Subsidence Act did not effect a taking. 8 9
B. 'Traditional" Takings: Physical Invasion, Occupation, or Acquisition
of Property
1. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. 90
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Marshall, announced a per se rule that,
when there is a permanent physical occupation, there is "a taking to the extent
of the occupation, without regard to whether the action achieves an important
public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the owner." 91 An own-
er of an apartment building in Manhattan had claimed that Teleprompter's in-
stallation of equipment on her building, pursuant to a New York law requiring
landlords to permit installation of cable television facilities on their property,
effected a taking without just compensation. 92
According to the Court, Penn Central did not change "the rule that a perma-
nent physical occupation is a government action of such a unique character that
85. 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
86. Id. at 1236, 1239. Pennsylvania law regards the support estate as an interest which can be conveyed
separately from the mineral and surface estates. Id. at 1250. The Court held that the support estate had value
only when connected with either the surface or the mineral estate and was "merely a part of the entire bundle
of rights possessed by the owner of either the coal 'rr the surface." Id.
87. Id. at 1242. The Court noted that it was "not suggest[ing] that courts have 'a license to judge the
effectiveness of legislation,' . . . or that courts are to undertake 'least restrictive alternative' analysis" but
was merely "examin[ing] the operative provisions of [the] statute, not just its stated purpose, in assessing
its true nature [as instructed by Pennsylvania Coal]." Id. at 1243 n. 16. In Pennsylvania Coal the Court said
that "[t]he greatest weight is given to the judgment of the legislature, but it always is open to interested par-
ties to contend that the legislature has gone beyond its constitutional power." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Ma-
hon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
88. Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1248.
89. Id. at 1248, 1251.
90. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
91. Id. at 434-35. "[A] physical intrusion by government [is] a property restriction of an unusually seri-
ous character for purposes of the Takings Clause." Id. at 426. "[Wlhen the physical intrusion reaches the
extreme form of a permanent physical occupation, a taking has occurred." Id.
92. Id. at 421, 424. Although the Court agreed that the law served the legitimate public purpose of
encouraging the development of cable television and was thus within the State's police power, it stated that
'whether an otherwise valid regulation so frustrates property rights that compensation must be paid" was
a separate question. Id. at 425.
[Vol. 8:217
HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY FOR LAND-USE REGULATION
it is a taking without regard to other factors that a court might ordinarily exa-
mine."9 3 The Court noted that permanent physical occupation "is perhaps the
most serious form of invasion of an owner's property interests"94 and that "[t]he
power to exclude has traditionally been considered one of the most treasured
strands in an owner's bundle of property rights."95 In addition, "a special kind
of injury [is suffered] when a stranger directly invades and occupies the own-
er's property."
96
The Court in conclusion emphasized the narrowness of its holding, pointing
out that it was merely "affirm[ing] the traditional rule that a permanent physi-
cal occupation of property is a taking." 97 The Court distinguished restrictions
on the use of property, stating that "[s]o long as these regulations do not re-
quire the landlord to suffer the physical occupation of a portion of his building
by a third party, they will be analyzed under the multifactor inquiry generally
applicable to nonpossessory governmental activity."98 Although the Nollan opin-
ion did not cite Loretto for this proposition, the Nollan Court's refusal to evalu-
ate the California Coastal Commission's action under the Penn Central economic
analysis is apparently based upon the Loretto Court's statement.
The Court clarified the rule of Loretto in Federal Communications Commis-
sion v. Florida Power Corp., 9 in which it held that the Pole Attachments Act,
which regulates rates charged by utility companies for installation of television
cables on utility poles, did not effect a per se taking. 100 Unlike the statute in
Loretto, which required landlords to permit installation of cable facilities on
their property, the Pole Attachments Act merely authorizes the Federal Com-
munications Commission to regulate rates charged under lease agreements en-
93. Id. at 432. The Court is referring to the economic impact of the regulation and the extent to which
it interferes with investment-backed expectations.
94. Id. at 435. The fact that the general public, and not the State itself, is the occupant is irrelevant.
Id. at 433 n.9.
95. Id. at 435. In Hodel v. Irving, 107 S. Ct. 2076 (1987), the Court equated the importance of the
right to devise property with the right to exclusive possession of property. It held that the escheat provision
of the Indian Land Consolidation Act, which requires that fractional property interests which were only mar-
ginally profitable in the preceding year escheat to the tribe under whose jurisdiction the land is subject, ef-
fected a taking of property without just compensation. Id. at 2084. The Court agreed that consolidation of
Indian lands is a valid public purpose and acknowledged the Government's power to regulate property in
ways that might adversely affect its owners. Id. at 2081, 2082. Despite the fact that there was no proof
of investment-backed expectations and the fact that owners of escheatable interests derived some benefits
if they were members of the tribe to which the property escheated, the Court held that the "extraordinary"
character of the government's action - the destruction of the right to devise property to heirs, even when
it might result in consolidation of property - went "'too far.'" Id. at 2083, 2084 (quoting Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)). The Penn Central economic analysis was used because
the Act destroyed only the right to devise property and did not affect inter vivos transfers. Id. at 2082.
96. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436. The Court characterized physical invasions as more severe than restric-
tions on use of property. Id.
97. Id. at 441.
98. Id. at 440 (citing Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)).
99. 107 S. Ct. 1107 (1987).
100. Id. at 1111.
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tered into voluntarily. 101 Since the "element of required acquiescence . . . at
the heart of the concept of occupation" 10 2 was missing, the case did not fall
within the "per se rule of Loretto. "103
2. Easements
A public access easement similar to the one involved in Nollan was at issue
in Kaiser Aetna v. United States. 104 Kaiser Aetna had converted a private pond
into a marina and had constructed a channel connecting the marina to a bay
and the Pacific Ocean. 10 5 The Army Corps of Engineers claimed that the once-
private pond had become navigable water and that Kaiser Aetna could not deny
public access to it. 106 The Court held that "the Government's attempt to create
a public right of access to the improved pond goes so far beyond ordinary regu-
lation or improvement for navigation as to amount to a taking under the logic
of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. "107 The Court stated that the "'right to
exclude,' so universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right,
falls within this category of interests that the Government cannot take without
compensation." 08 Noting that the Government's attempted regulation would result
in an actual physical invasion, the Court held that "even if the Government phys-
ically invades only an easement in property, it must nonetheless pay just com-
pensation."109
Kaiser Aetna was distinguished in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 110
in which the Court held that enforcement of a California constitutional provi-
sion protecting rights of free speech and petition, which required the shopping
center to permit petitioning activity on its property, did not effect a taking of
property without just compensation. The fact that there was a physical invasion
of the shopping center's property was not determinative because the shopping
center, unlike the marina in Kaiser Aetna, was already open to members of
101. Id. at 1112.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1113.
104. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
105. Id. at 166-67. The Army Corps of Engineers was notified of Kaiser Aetna's development plans,
and the Corps advised Kaiser Aetna that no development permit was necessary. Id. at 167.
106. Id. at 168.
107. Id. at 178. The Court acknowledged that the commerce power authorized Congress to assure public
access to the pond, but it stated that whether any legislation designed to accomplish that purpose was a tak-
ing was an entirely separate issue. Id. at 174.
108. Id. at 179-80.
109. Id. at 180. In United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), the Court held that low-altitude government
flights over a chicken farm were continuous invasions of the property resulting in imposition of a servitude
upon the land, entitling the property owner to compensation for the easement taken. Id. at 265-68. Even
though the use and enjoyment of the land was not completely destroyed, the noise caused by the flights had
forced the farmer to discontinue his chicken business; and the Court held that the value of the land was
diminished as a result. Id. at 259, 262.
110. 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980).
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the public. 111 The requirement did not interfere with the shopping center's ex-
pectations because the "'right to exclude others' [was not proven to be] ...
essential to the use or economic value of [the shopping center's] property." 112
3. Governmental Acquisition of Property
a. Eminent Domain and the "Public Use" Requirement
When a state exercises its eminent domain power, rather than its police pow-
er, and takes private property for public use, with payment of compensation,
the Court will uphold the action as long as "the legislature's purpose is legiti-
mate and its means are not irrational." 1 3
The Court in Berman v. Parker11 upheld the District of Columbia Redevelop-
ment Act of 1945, which allowed the government to condemn property, with
payment of compensation, to eliminate substandard housing and urban blight.
A department store owner's claim that condemnation of his property was an
unconstitutional taking was rejected because the department store, even though
innocuous standing alone, was an obstacle to the redevelopment program, which
"need not... be on a piecemeal basis." '1 5 The Court concluded that "[tihe rights
of these property owners are satisfied when they receive that just compensation
which the Fifth Amendment exacts as the price of the taking."
1 16
A compensated taking pursuant to Hawaii's Land Reform Act of 1967 was
approved in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff. 117 The Land Reform Act was
designed to alleviate problems resulting from concentrated land ownership and
provided for condemnation of residential leasehold property and transfer of
ownership to lessees. 18 The Court stated that the success of the Act in achiev-
ing its goals was not at issue since "'the [constitutional requirement] is satisfied
if ... the . . .[state] Legislature rationally could have believed that the [Act]
would promote its objective.'- 119 Assuming for purposes of argument that the
111. Id. at 83, 84.
112. Id. at 84. The Court also rejected the shopping center's argument that it was deprived of property
without due process of law, holding that it had not demonstrated that the requirement was "'unreasonable,
arbitrary or capricious, [or] that the means [did not] have a real and substantial relation to the objective
[sic] sought to be attained.'" id. at 85 (quoting Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934)).
113. Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242-43 (1984).
114. 348 U.S. 26, 28 (1954).
115. Id. at 35. "[T]he amount and character of the land to be taken for the project and the need for a
particular tract to complete the integrated plan rests in the discretion of the legislative branch." Id. at 35-36.
116. Id. at 36.
117. 467 U.S. 229, 231-32 (1984).
118. Id. at 233.
119. Id. at 242 (quoting Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648,
672 (1981)). According to the Court, "[when] the legislature's purpose is legitimate and its means are not
irrational. ... empirical debates over the wisdom of takings... are not to be carried out in the federal
courts." Id. at 242-43. In Nolan Justice Brennan argued that this standard should have been used to evaluate
the Commission's action. 107 S. Ct. at 3151 (Brennan, J., dissenting). However, Nollan is distinguishable
because the California Coastal Commission attempted to achieve its goal through an uncompensated taking
under the police power rather than a compensated taking under the eminent domain power, as in Midkiff.
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just compensation requirement had been met, the Court concluded that the Act
was a "rational exercise of the eminent domain power" and that it did not vio-
late the "public use" requirement of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 
120
b. Appropriation of Property Rights
When the governmental action involves appropriation or acquisition of
property, the Court has generally held that just compensation is required. 121
In Armstrong v. United States, 122Armstrong had furnished materials to a prime
contractor for use in constructing boats pursuant to a contract with the United
States Government. 123 When the prime contractor defaulted, the Government
exercised a contractual option providing for transfer of title in the uncompleted
boats and building materials to the Government. 124 Armstrong claimed that this
action destroyed the value of its materialmen's liens in the building materials
and thus violated the fifth amendment. 125 The Court stated that "[tihe Fifth
Amendment's guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public
use without just compensation was designed to bar Government from forcing
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole" 12 6 and held that Armstrong was enti-
tled to compensation for the value of the liens. 127
Nollan is simply an additional illustration of an exercise of the police power
which went too far. The decision is consistent with the Court's prior rulings,
and it reaffirms that the Court is less likely to uphold an exercise of the police
power where private property is actually appropriated, occupied, or invaded
than where its use is merely restricted.
120. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 239, 243, 245. The Court stated that "[t]he 'public use' requirement is ... coter-
minous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers," id. at 240, and that it would "not substitute its judg-
ment for a legislature's judgment as to what constitutes a public use 'unless the use be palpably without reasonable
foundation.'" Id. at 241 (quoting United States v. Gettysburg Elec. R. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896)).
The Court pointed out that "where the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally related to a con-
ceivable public purpose, [the Court] has never held a compensated taking to be proscribed by the .Public
Use Clause." Id. (emphasis added).
121. Cf. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1006 (1984) (government use and disclosure of
trade secrets voluntarily submitted in a pesticide registration application does not effect a taking of property
without just compensation unless the applicant had a reasonable, investment-backed expectation that the data
would be kept confidential).
122. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
123. Id. at 41.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 41-42.
126. Id. at 49. See also Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893) (The
fifth amendment "prevents the public from loading upon one individual more than his just share of the bur-
dens of government, and says that when he surrenders to the public something more and different from that
which is exacted from other members of the public, a full and just equivalent shall be returned to him.").
127. Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 48-49.
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IV. INSTANT CASE
The United States Supreme Court held that the California Coastal Commis-
sion could obtain an easement across the Nollans' beach only through the exer-
cise of its eminent domain power. 128 The Court began its opinion in Nollan
by stating that the easement would have been a per se taking had it not been
imposed as a condition to the granting of a building permit. 129 Since the Com-
mission required the easement as a condition to permitting the Nollans to build
a new house on their lot, the Court analyzed the Commission's action as "land
use regulation." 130 Because the easement resulted in a "'permanent physical
occupation' "131 of the Nollans' property, the Court did not conduct the eco-
nomic balancing described in Penn Central. 132
The California Coastal Commission advanced four reasons for imposition of
the easement condition, three of which were intended to alleviate the obstacles
to visual access to the beach created by the Nollans' new house: "protecting
the public's ability to see the beach, assisting the public in overcoming the 'psy-
chological barrier' to using the beach created by a developed shorefront, and
preventing congestion on the public beaches."1a3 The Court assumed, for the
purpose of argument, that these reasons would justify the Commission in deny-
ing the Nollans' request for the building permit "if their new house . . would
substantially impede these purposes, unless the denial would interfere so drasti-
cally with the Nollans' use of their property as to constitute a taking."1 3Be-
128. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3150.
129. Id. at 3145. This is consistent with the Court's holding in Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S.
164, 180 (1979) ("even if the Government physically invades only an easement in property, it must nonethe-
less pay just compensation"). Justice Brennan distinguished an easement from a dedication, saying that the
latter "requires the surrender of ownership of property rather than, as in this case, a mere restriction on
its use." Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3154 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The majority contended that this charac-
terization was a "use [of] words in a manner that deprives them of all their ordinary meaning" and pointed
out that "one of the principal uses of the eminent domain power is to assure that the government be able
to require conveyance of just such interests, so long as it pays for them." Id. at 3145.
130. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3146.
131. Id. at 3145.
132. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) ("the economic impact of
the regulation" and "the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expec-
tations"). The Court's approach in Nollan is consistent with its statement in Loreno that "[s]o long as ... regu-
lations do not require the . . . physical occupation of a portion of [property] by a third party, they will be
analyzed under the multifactor inquiry [of Penn Central] generally applicable to nonpossessory governmen-
tal activity." Loretto, 458 U.S. at 440. Penn Central also supports this approach. One of the three factors
in the Penn Central test is "the character of the governmental action." Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. As
the Penn Central Court pointed out, "[a] taking' may more readily be found when the interference with property
can be characterized as a physical invasion by government." Id.
133. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3147.
134. Id. The Court indicated that the Commission was not limited to considering only the impact of the
Nollans' new house; it could also consider "the cumulative impact produced in conjunction with other con-
struction." Id. However, the Court pointed out that "[i]f the Nollans were being singled out to bear the bur-
den of California's attempt to remedy these problems, although they had not contributed to it more than other
coastal landowners, the State's action, even if otherwise valid, might violate either the incorporated Takings
Clause or the Equal Protection Clause." Id. n.4.
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cause "the wall of houses completely blocked the view of the beach and...
a person looking from the road would not be able to see it at all,"1 35 the ease-
ment, which provided for lateral access along the beach, "utterly fail[ed] to further
the end advanced." 136 The Court stated that "[ilt is quite impossible to under-
stand how a requirement that people already on the public beaches be able to
walk across the Nollans' property reduces any obstacles to viewing the beach
created by the new house."1 37 Since the easement would not advance the same
purpose that would be served by a denial of the permit, the purpose was con-
verted into "the obtaining of an easement. . . without payment of compen-
sation."138
The fourth reason advanced by the Commission as justification for requiring
the easement was that it was necessary as "'part of a comprehensive program
to provide continuous public access along Faria Beach as the lots undergo de-
velopment or redevelopment.' "139 The Court characterized this justification as
"unrelated to land use regulation"40 but did not elaborate. 141 The explanation
is simply that this justification did not meet the Court's test of validity for land-
use regulation. As the Court explained, "unless the permit condition serves the
same governmental purpose as the development ban, the building restriction
is not a valid regulation of land use but 'an out-and-out plan of extortion.' "142
The fact that the easement would substantially advance the goal of public ac-
cess to the beach is irrelevant to the issue of whether the Commission had the
authority to implement its comprehensive program pursuant to its police pow-
er. The fact that the Commission's program could be implemented through its
eminent domain power is a separate issue. 143
135. Id. at 3150.
136. Id. at 3148. Justice Brennan argued that the lateral access condition satisfied the majority's test, part-
ly because it would "dissipate the impression" that the beach is private because persons passing along the
road in front of the Nollans' house would see "numerous people . . . passing and repassing along the dry
sand." Id. at 3154 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan apparently overlooked the Commission's find-
ing that the beach could not be seen from the road in front of the Nollans' house. His argument is also under-
mined by his later statement that the easement, by permitting the public to walk closer to the eight-foot high
seawall, would "make the [Nollans] even less visible to the public than passage along the high tide area far-
ther out on the beach." Id. at 3157 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Since the Nollans' house is located between
the beach and the road in front of their house, it is obvious that the road would also be less visible from
the beach. Thus, even if the beach could be seen from the road, the easement would reduce the ability of
persons passing along the road to see persons walking along the beach.
137. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3149.
138. Id. at 3148.
139. Id. at 3150 (quoting Record, App. 68).
140. Id.
141. Justice Brennan expressed puzzlement at the Court's characterization, describing the Commission's
action as "the essence of responsible land use planning." Id. at 3154 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 3148 (quoting J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Atkinson, 121 N.H. 581,584, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (1981)).
143. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 425 ("whether an otherwise valid regulation so frustrates property rights
that compensation must be paid" is a separate question). In the Court's words, "The Commission may well
be right that [the comprehensive program to provide public access] is a good idea, but that does not establish
that the Nollans (and other coastal residents) alone can be compelled to contribute to its realization." Nollan,
107 S. Ct. at 3150.
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Although provision of public access along the beach is a legitimate state in-
terest, the Commission could not constitutionally deny the Nollans' request for
a permit in order to achieve that purpose. The means-denial of the permit-
would not in any way advance the end-provision of public access along the
beach. If the Commission had denied the permit, the Nollans would have re-
tained their private beach; and the Commission could obtain access only through
the exercise of its eminent domain power. Since denial of the permit would
not further the goal of public access, any condition imposed as an alternative
is equally impermissible.
Since the stated police power objective of providing a continuous strip of pub-
licly accessible beach could not be advanced by a denial of the request for a
permit, the risk to which the Court referred is apparent: the real purpose achieved
through imposition of the condition would be avoidance of the compensation
requirement, which "is not a valid regulation of land use." 1" Therefore, the
Court held that the Commission's objective of providing continuous public ac-
cess along the beach could be achieved only through the exercise of eminent
domain: "if [California] wants an easement across the Nollans' property, it must
pay for it." 145 Compliance with the just compensation provision requires "more
than an exercise of cleverness and imagination," and the Court applied height-
ened scrutiny to prevent the Commission from exercising its police power, un-
der the guise of land-use regulation, in an attempt to avoid the just compensation
requirement. 146
Nollan reaffirmed the protection the Court has traditionally extended to the
right of exclusive use and possession of property 14 7 and confirmed that, when
the governmental action results in physical occupation of property, the economic
balancing test of Penn Central is inappropriate. The Court, however, retreated
from the per se rule of Loretto in situations where the physical occupation is
"a condition to the lifting of a land use restriction," 148and emphatically repudi-
ated any notion that every land-use regulation involving physical invasion of
property is a taking. The Court described several alternative means by which
144. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3148.
145. Id. at 3150.
146. Id. It is well settled that the just compensation requirement is a limitation upon the police power.
See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378, 2389 (1987)
("many of the provisions of the Constitution are designed to limit the flexibility and freedom of governmen-
tal authorities and the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment is one of them"); Pruneyard Shop-
ping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) ("It is ... well established that a State in the exercise of
its police power may adopt reasonable restrictions on private property so long as the restrictions do not amount
to a taking without just compensation or contravene any other federal constitutional provision"). Cf United
States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 75 (1982) ("The bankruptcy power is subject to the Fifth Amend-
ment's prohibition against taking private property without compensation .... Thus, however 'rational' the
exercise of the bankruptcy power may be, that inquiry is quite separate from the question whether the enact-
ment takes property within the prohibition of the Fifth Amendment.").
147. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3145.
148. Id. at 3150.
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the Commission could have constitutionally achieved its goal of protecting the
public's ability to see the beach, one of which is a "requirement that the Nol-
lans provide a viewing spot on their property for passersby with whose sight-
ing of the ocean their new house would interfere." 119 Like the easement required
by the Commission, this condition, too, would result in physical occupation
of the Nollans' property. Unlike the easement requiring lateral access along the
beach, the condition suggested by the Court would substantially advance the
public's ability to see the beach, which is the same purpose that would be served
by a refusal to issue the building permit. In other words, assuming that the Com-
mission could refuse to issue the permit to protect the public's ability to see
the beach, a condition imposed as an alternative to the denial is constitutional
if it is designed to achieve the same purpose as a denial, even if it involves
physical invasion of private property.
The Court held that the standard of review for interference with property rights
under the police power is whether the regulation "'substantially advance[s] legiti-
mate state interests' [or denies] 'an owner economically viable use of his land.'",s°
The Court stated that it is "inclined to be particularly careful about the adjec-
tive ["substantial"] where the actual conveyance of property is made a condi-
tion to the lifting of a land use restriction, since in that context there is heightened
risk that the purpose is avoidance of the compensation requirement, rather than
the stated police power objective."151
Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented, arguing that the rational basis stan-
dard used in due process and equal protection cases should also be used to review
the rationality of an exercise of the police power in takings cases. ' 5 2 In their
opinion, the Court should have used the Penn Central balancing test to deter-
mine whether the Commission's action exceeded its police power and became
a taking. 5 3 Utilizing that approach, they concluded that the Commission's re-
quirement of the easement was a reasonable exercise of its police power and
that "neither the character of governmental action nor the nature of the private
interest affected raise any takings concern."
54
Justices Brennan and Marshall thought that the Commission's action satis-
fied even the Court's "unusual demand for a precise match between the condi-
tion imposed and the specific type of burden on access created by the
149. Id. at 3148.
150. Id. at 3146 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)). The easement did not
deprive the Nollans of the use of the remainder of their lot; however, since the easement involved permanent
physical occupation, economic viability was irrelevant, and the Court did not discuss that part of the test.
It is extremely unlikely that a denial of the Nollans' request would have resulted in depriving them of eco-
nomically viable use of their land since they probably could have renovated the bungalow and continued
to rent it to summer vacationers.
151. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3150.
152. Id. at 3151-53 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 3156 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 3160 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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[Nollans]. " l5 They pointed out that the Commission, in addition to concern
about blockage of visual access to the beach, was also concerned that "'the en-
croaching nature of private use immediately adjacent to the public use' " 6 might
make the public think that the beach was private. Since the Nollans' new house
expanded private development toward the seawall, they argued that the ease-
ment directly addressed the threat to public access created by the Nollans' new
house. 15 7 This alleged justification for the easement, however, is no different
from the others advanced by the Commission. A denial of the Nollans' request
would not advance the goal of protecting public access to the beach, nor would
it decrease private use immediately adjacent to public use of the beach because
the Nollans' beach would remain private and would still be immediately adja-
cent to public tidelands. The burden on public access would remain the same
whether or not the Nollans replaced their bungalow with a larger house.
Justice Blackmun also dissented, arguing that "[t]he land-use problems this
country faces require creative solutions . . . [which] are not advanced by an
'eye for an eye' mentality."1 s8 Justice Stevens expressed his concern about the
"chilling effect" 159 of the Court's decisions in Nollan and First English Evan-
gelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeleslw6 upon the ability of state
agencies to exercise flexibility in regulating land use. 161
As Justice Brennan noted, the Court's decision may have little impact since
the Nollans' beach may already belong to the public. '6 2 A report from a Senior
Land Agent with the State Attorney General's Office to the California Coastal
Commission made the following finding: "'[B ] ased on my observations, present-
ly, most, if not all of Faria Beach waterward of the existing seawalls [lies] be-
low the Mean High Tide Level, and would fall in public domain or sovereign
category of ownership.' 163 If so, "the net result will have been a large expen-
diture of judicial resources on a constitutional claim of little moment."
6 4
155. Id. at 3154 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 3155 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Record, App. 59).
157. Id. Justices Brennan and Marshall also contended that the easement was justified because it would
prevent boundary disputes between the Nollans and the public resulting from the fact that the mean high
tide line, which is the boundary between public tidelands and the Nollans' property, "'fluctuates during the
year depending on the seasons and accompanying storms, and the public is not always able to traverse the
shoreline below the mean high tide line.' "Id. (quoting Record, App. 67). The Court rejected this argument,
noting that "risk of boundary disputes ... is inherent in the right to exclude others from one's property,
and the construction here can no more justify mandatory dedication of a sort of 'buffer zone' in order to
avoid boundary disputes than can the construction of an addition to a single-family house near a public street."
Id. at 3149 n.6.
158. Id. at 3162 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 3163 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
160. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987), discussed supra notes 67-75 and accompanying text.
161. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3163 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 3161 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 3161 n.11 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Record, App. 85).
164. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 456 n.12 (1982) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
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V. ANALYSIS
A. Conditions on Use of Property
The California Coastal Commission's attempt to obtain the easement across
the Nollans' property by characterizing its action as an exercise of its police
power to regulate land use is similar to an argument rejected by the Court in
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. 165 There, the cable company
argued that since the law requiring landlords to allow cable installations on their
property applied only to buildings used as rental property it was a permissible
regulation of the use of property. 1 66 The Court stated that even though a land-
lord "could avoid the requirements of [the law] by ceasing to rent the building
to tenants . . . a landlord's ability to rent his property may not be conditioned
on his forfeiting the right to compensation for a physical occupation." 67 Although
the Nollans could have avoided the easement by withdrawing their request for
a building permit, the Court refused to allow the Commission to condition the
Nollans' ability to rebuild on their property upon the forfeiting of their right
to compensation for the easement.
Analyzed under the Nollan test, forbidding the landlord in Loretto to use the
building as rental property would not advance the objective of encouraging the
development of cable television; therefore, conditioning the right to use the build-
ing as rental property upon the owner's allowance of the installation of cable
equipment would also be impermissible. As the Loretto Court noted:
Teleprompter's broad "use-dependency" argument proves too much. For
example, it would allow the government to require a landlord to devote
a substantial portion of his building to vending and washing machines, with
all profits to be retained by the owners of these services and with no com-
pensation for the deprivation of space. It would even allow the government
to requisition a certain number of apartments as permanent government
offices. The right of a property owner to exclude a stranger's physical oc-
cupation of his land cannot be so easily manipulated. 
16
In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co. 169 the Court held that a statutory provision
authorizing government use and disclosure of trade secrets contained in a pes-
ticide registration application was not an unconstitutional condition on the right
165. 458 U.S. 419 (1982), discussed supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text.
166. Id. at 438-39.
167. Id. at 439 n. 17. Similarly, in Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979), discussed
supra notes 104-109 and accompanying text, the Court stated that, although the Government could have
refused to permit Kaiser Aetna to dredge a channel connecting its private marina to navigable waters or
could have granted its approval upon the condition that Kaiser Aetna comply with measures designed to
promote navigation, the Government could not take the fundamental "'right to exclude'" unless it compen-
sated Kaiser Aetna.
168. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 439 n.17.
169. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
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to receive a valuable government benefit (registration). 170 Justice Brennan ar-
gued that since the Nollans were aware of the fact that development permits
would be approved by the Commission only upon the condition of a public ac-
cess easement they, like Monsanto, had no investment-backed expectations with
regard to the right to deny public access to the beach. '71 The Court rejected
the "peculiar proposition that a unilateral claim of entitlement by the govern-
ment can alter property rights" 172 and distinguished Monsanto by saying that
"the right to build on one's own property - even though its exercise can be
subjected to legitimate permitting requirements - cannot remotely be described
as a 'governmental benefit.' "173
B. The Standard of Review
Confusion as to the appropriate standard of review has been generated by
the Court's failure to distinguish between the two separate issues involved in
a takings clause challenge: the end (a public use) and the means chosen to at-
tain that end (either the police power or the eminent domain power). Confu-
sion has also resulted from the Court's lack of attention to which of the two
property-protection clauses of the fifth amendment 17 has allegedly been vio-
lated. 175
According to the Nollan Court, the rational basis test employed in due process
and equal protection challenges to ordinary social and economic legislation is
not appropriate where "the regulation of property is at issue."176 Instead, an
abridgement of property rights under the police power is constitutional only
if "it 'substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests.'1 77 When the Court
reviews the means chosen to achieve the purposes of ordinary social or eco-
nomic legislation on substantive due process or equal protection grounds, all
that is required is that "the State 'could rationally have decidedf that the meas-
170. Id. at 1007. The Court said that the provision was simply a burden that went along with doing busi-
ness. Id.
171. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3159-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 3146 n.2.
173. Id.
174. "No person shall be . . . deprived of. . . property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The "public use" and
"just compensation" guarantees are applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Chicago, Burling-
ton & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 234-35 (1897),
175. See R. CUNNINGHAM, W. SToaaucic & D. WHITMAN, supra note 40, at 518 ("the courts generally
do not distinguish clearly between 'substantive due process' and 'taking' arguments"). This lack of attention
is illustrated in Nollan, in which the majority cited Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962)
in its discussion of the standards of review for takings, due process, and equal protection challenges. 107
. Ct. at 3147 n.3. The Court seemed to think that Goldblatt assumed that the standards are the same, but
Goldblau involved only a substantive due process claim. There was no allegation that private property had
been taken for public use without just compensation. Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 591.
176. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3147 n.3.
177. Id. at 3146 (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 225, 260 (1980)).
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ure adopted might achieve the State's objective." 178 According to Justice Bren-
nan, "[tjhese minor differences [in phraseology] cannot . . . obscure the fact
that the inquiry in each case is the same."
179
These differences in phraseology do seem to be minor, but they have played
a significant role in equal protection methodology. Classifications are presumed
to be constitutional under the rational basis test, and the challenger has the bur-
den of proving that the challenged governmental action has no rational basis. 180
However, the government has the burden of demonstrating that gender clas-
sifications "serve important governmental objectives and [are] substantially related
to achievement of those objectives."181 Justice Brennan later described this ar-
ticulation as "'intermediate' scrutiny"18 2 and stated that this standard is used only
"when concerns sufficiently absolute and enduring can be clearly ascertained
from the Constitution and our cases." 18 3 Classifications which disadvantage a
suspect class or interfere with a fundamental right are subject to strict scrutiny:
the state has the burden of demonstrating "that its classification has been pre-
cisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest."" * Fundamental
rights are those which have their source explicitly or iiplicitly in the Constitu-
tion. 185
Under the Nollan test the state's interest need only be "legitimate," rather than
"important." Thus, under Nollan, the end (a public use) is reviewed under the
rational basis test, while the method used to achieve the end (physical occupa-
tion of private property or a restriction on its use) is subject to heightened scru-
tiny, i.e., the means must be "substantially related" to achievement of the
government's objective. As the Court noted, the cases relied upon by Justice
Brennan in support of his argument that the rational basis test should apply to
takings challenges involve substantive due process or equal protection
challenges. 186 In each of those cases, the Court utilized rational basis review
178. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3151 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery
Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981)). See also Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 388 (1932) (substantive due
process and equal protection clauses; "[w]hen the subject lies within the police power of the State, debatable
questions as to reasonableness are not for the courts but for the legislature").
179. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3152 n. 1 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun agreed that "a State's
exercise of its police power need be no more than rationally based." Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3163 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
180. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & Y. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 358 (3d ed. 1986).
181. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (Brennan, J.) (emphasis added). This formulation has been described
as an "intermediate level of review," J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & Y. YOUNG, supra note 180, at 670, and
as "heightened scrutiny." G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN, M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 626
(1986).
182. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218 n.16 (1982).
183. Id.
184. See id. at 217.
185. Id. at 217 n.15.
186. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3147 n.3.
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and upheld ordinary social or economic legislation. 187 The Court's decisions
in those cases underscore the fact that "it is rare that any law or classification
would be held to violate substantive due process or equal protection principles
under the rationality standard." 18
The heightened scrutiny used in Nollan is justifiable because it both preserves
the viability of the just compensation requirement and protects the traditional
expectation of private property owners that they "will be relatively undisturbed
at least in the possession of. . . property."18 9 If governments were free to ex-
ercise their police power without limitation to impose conditions upon the use
of property, they would have no need for the eminent domain power except
in the rare cases in which they had no other means of exercising leverage over
property owners. 190 Given the fact that local governments have "broad power
to impose appropriate restrictions upon an owner's use of his property,"1 91 it
is difficult to imagine a situation in which that broad power, if evaluated only
by mere rationality, could not be used to condition land use upon a property
owner's agreement to transfer part of the property to the government. 19 2 Thus,
the rational basis test's deference to legislative judgment regarding the
appropriateness of means would result in making the just compensation require-
ment virtually meaningless. As* the Court pointed out, the adjective "substan-
tial" is especially significant "where the actual conveyance of property is made
a condition to the lifting of a land use regulation, since in that context there
is heightened risk that the purpose is avoidance of the compensation require-
ment, rather than the stated police power objective.",
93
C. The Significance of the "Right to Exclude Others"
The Court has frequently described property rights as a "bundle" made up
of various "sticks" or "strands," including rights "'to possess, use and dispose
of it.""194 The Court has repeatedly held that, "as to property reserved by its
owner for private use, 'the right to exclude [others is] "one of the most essential
187. E.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (law banning plastic, nonretur-
nable milk bottles); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (statute prohibiting
fitting or duplication of eyeglasses without a prescription); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S.
421 (1952) (law prohibiting employers from deducting wages for employees who missed work to vote); Sproles
v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374 (1932) (law imposing size and weight limitations upon motor vehicles using state
highways); Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894) (law prohibiting use of fishing nets).
188. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 180, at 356.
189. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436 (1982). See supra notes 90-98
and accompanying text.
190. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413, 415 (1922) (if police power is unlimited,
private property will eventually disappear).
191. Loretto, 419 U.S. at 441.
192. See, e.g., id. at 439 n.17.
193. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3150.
194. See, e.g., Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435 (quoting United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373,
378 (1945)); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979).
1988]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property."' 1 9 5
The Loretto Court described "permanent physical occupation of another's
property ... [as] perhaps the most serious form of invasion of an owner's
property interests" 96 and held that where permanent physical occupation is in-
volved there is "a taking to the extent of the occupation, without regard to whether
the action achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal economic
impact on the owner."
19 7
The Court's repeated references to the right of a private property owner to
exclude others demonstrate that the Court considers this right to be worthy of
special protection. 198 While the right of a property owner to exclude others may
not be classified as fundamental under equal protection or substantive due process
principles, it does justify heightened judicial scrutiny under the takings clause;
and the Court's decisions indicate that it has had a significant role in the de-
velopment of takings jurisprudence. The Court has referred to the right to ex-
clude as "a fundamental element of the property right . . . [which] the
Government cannot take without compensation."' 99 Since the takings clause and
the cases interpreting and applying it clearly demonstrate that the right to ex-
clude is a fundamental aspect of property ownership and that just compensa-
tion must be paid when private property is taken for a public use, these "concerns
[are] sufficiently absolute and enduring" to justify heightened scrutiny. 200
In his dissenting opinion in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,201
Justice Blackmun discussed the right to exclude and contended that "new social
circumstances can justify legislative modifications of a property owner's common-
law rights, without compensation, if the legislative action serves sufficiently
important public interests." 20 2 In support of this proposition, he cited Munn v.
195. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3145 (quoting Loreno, 458 U.S. at 433, quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)). Cf Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84 (1980) (the right
to exclude others was not essential because the shopping center was open to members of the public).
196. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435.
197. Id. at 434-35. Accord Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1250 n.27
(1987) ("We do not suggest that the State may physically appropriate relatively small amounts of private
property for its own use without paying just compensation.").
198. The right of a property owner to exclude others from his property implicates some of the same con-
cers underlying the right to privacy, which the Court has recognized as a "fundamental right." See Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Under tort law the right of privacy protects private property from
intrusion by outsiders. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 180, at 684. Justice Brandeis ar-
gued that the right to be alone is "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). In his concurring
opinion in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), Justice Marshall (who dissented in
NoUan) acknowledged the "limits on governmental authority to abolish 'core' common-law rights, including
rights against trespass," id. at 94 (Marshall, J., concurring), but he concluded "[t]hat 'core' [had] not been
approached [since rights of privacy were not implicated, nor was] any personal sanctuary [invaded]." Id.
199. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979).
200. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218 n.16 (1982).
201. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
202. Id. at 454 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Illinois, 203 in which the Court stated that "[a] person has no property, no vested
interest in any rule of the common law."20 However, Munn also held that "[r]ights
of property which have been created by the common law cannot be taken away
without due process; but the law itself, as a rule of conduct, may be changed
at the will . . . of the legislature, unless prevented by constitutional limita-
tions. "205 The fifth amendment's just compensation requirement is a constitu-
tional limitation upon a state's power to abrogate the traditional common-law
right of an owner of private property to exclude others. 206 Munn thus does not
support the proposition that important public goals or new social circumstances
can justify denial of just compensation when the right to exclude is taken from
a property owner.
Justice Brennan acknowledged that "government action may be a valid exer-
cise of the police power and still violate specific provisions of the Constitu-
tion." 207 Although he did not disagree that the fifth amendment's prohibition
against taking private property for public use without just compensation is such
a specific limitation on the exercise of the police power, he attempted to avoid
the limiting effect through a very narrow definition of "taking." In his opinion
the economic factors identified in Penn Central furnish an adequate "analytical
framework for protecting the values underlying the Takings Clause."
20
8
In cases involving physical occupation of property, the Penn Central approach
is inappropriate. One of the values underlying the constitutional protection of
private property, the right to exclude others, is all but ignored when the Penn
Central test is applied to cases involving physical occupation. Unlike predict-
ing economic impact, determining whether a regulation will involve physical
occupation is readily apparent in advance of governmental.-action. Therefore,
the Penn Central test is much more vague than the tests of Loretto and Nollan;
and it does not furnish land-use planners with any guidance which would ad-
dress Justice Stevens' concern that "local governments and officials must pay
the price"2 9 for those vague standards. Finally, the Court has previously held
that the nature of the governmental action is determinative in cases involving
permanent physical occupation and that only regulations involving "nonposses-
sory governmental activity" are to be analyzed under the economic part of the
Penn Central test.
210
203. 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
204. Id. at 134.
205. Id. (emphasis added).
206. See supra note 146.
207. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3152 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 3163 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan also expressed concern that the Court's deci-
sion would "penalize the Commission for its flexibility, hampering [its] ability" to responsibly manage coastal
land use. Id. at 3153 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
210. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 440 (1982).
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An analysis of the Commission's action in Nollan demonstrates the impropriety
of applying the three factors of Penn Centrars economic balancing test:
(1) Nature of the Governmental Action. The intrusion permitted is minimal
since the area covered by the easement is at most ten feet wide and the Nollans
retain exclusive possession of the remainder of their lot. 211 Justice Brennan ar-
gued that the Nollans could not claim that the public's ability to walk along the
beach a few feet closer to their seawall diminished either their enjoyment of
their property or its value. 212 This approach conflicts with the Court's previous
announcement that "constitutional protection for the rights of private property
cannot be made to depend on the size of the area permanently occupied."
213
In addition, although the intrusion may have seemed minimal to Justice Bren-
nan, it is doubtful that the Nollans would agree since, according to the Juris-
dictional Statement, the easement was to be over approximately one-third of
their lot. 214
Justice Brennan also argued that the easement was necessary to enforce a "state
constitutional provision guaranteeing public access to the ocean." 215 As the Court
pointed out, this argument was neither advanced by the Commission nor decid-
ed by the state court; and California's interpretation of this provision suggests
that use of the eminent domain power is necessary to obtain access easements
across private property. 216 Furthermore, the California Constitution, like all
other state constitutions, is limited by the just compensation clause. 217 Even
if the California Constitution does require the Commission to guarantee public
access to the ocean, the Court's opinion would not prevent the Commission from
doing so under its eminent domain power. 218
(2) Economic Impact of the Regulation. In Justice Brennan's opinion this fac-
tor "reinforces the conclusion that no taking has occurred" 219 because the Nol-
lans were allowed to increase the value of their property in exchange for allowing
public access across their beach. Under this theory, permission to make practi-
cally any improvement of real property could be conditioned upon a require-
ment that a portion of that property be conveyed to the government or made
211. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3156 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
212. Id. at 3157 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
213. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436-37.
214. Jurisdictional Statement at 6, Nollan. "It is the owner's loss, not the taker's gain, which is the meas-
ure of the value of the property taken." United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946).
215. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3157 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing CAL. CoNasT. art. X, § 4). Justice Bren-
nan cited Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), for the proposition that "public access
rested upon a 'state constitutional . . . provision that had been construed to create rights to the use of private
property by strangers.'" Id. (quoting Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 81). However, "the owner [in Pruneyardl had
already opened his property to the general public." Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3145 n.l.
216. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3145-46.
217. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
218. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3150.
219. Id. at 3158 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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available for public use, without compensation. 220 Such an approach would vir-
tually nullify the just compensation requirement and would remove the neces-
sity for eminent domain. 221 If, instead of exacting an easement, the Commission
had required the Nollans to make their guest bedroom available to the public
in exchange for being allowed to build a larger house on their lot, certainly
no one would dispute that "[t]he right of a property owner to exclude a stranger's
physical occupation of his land cannot be so easily manipulated." 222 Of course,
it would be extremely difficult for the Commission to justify such a bizarre
requirement as a legitimate state interest; however, assuming that it could do
so, 223 neither the rational basis test nor the Penn Central economic theory would
be likely to prevent it from making the requirement.
Justice Brennan also argued that the Nollans benefited from the Commission's
efforts to preserve public access because "[t]hey are able to walk along the beach
beyond the confines of their own property only because the Commission has
required deed restrictions as a condition of approving other new beach develop-
ments ."224 Technically, this is incorrect. The Nollans and all other members
of the public have always been allowed to walk along the beach below the mean
high tide line, which is the boundary between public tidelands and private
beach. 225 Moreover, the fact that other property owners agreed to easements
and did not assert their constitutional claims does not undermine the validity
of the Nollans' claim.
(3) Investment-Backed Expectations. Justice Brennan argued that the California
Constitution's guarantee of public access to navigable water prevented the Nol-
lans from having a "reasonable claim to any expectation of being able to ex-
clude members of the public from crossing the edge of their property to gain
access to the ocean" 226 and that the Commission's "constitutional and statutory
duty require[d] that approval of new coastline development be conditioned upon
provisions ensuring lateral public access to the ocean." 227 Assuming that the
Commission had such a duty, it does not support the conclusion that the Com-
mission can ignore the federal Constitution's requirement of just compensation
in fulfilling its obligations. Moreover, the federal Constitution furnished the
220. Cf. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 439 n.17, in which the Court rejected the argument that the government
could require the owner of the apartment building to allow cable facilities on her property as a condition
to permitting her to use the building as rental property. As the Court pointed out, this theory would authorize
the government to requisition some of the apartments for use as government offices. Id.
221. See supra notes 190-93 and accompanying text.
222. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 439 n.17.
223. If overnight accommodations were scarce in the area, the Commission could perhaps claim that the
scarcity of lodging was caused by extensive private residential development along the beach, and that the
visiting public was being denied the opportunity to enjoy "an overall beach resource experience." Jurisdic-
tional Statement, App. E, at E-42.
224. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3158 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
225. Id. at 3155 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
226. Id. at 3158 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
227. Id. at 3159 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Nollans with "a historically rooted expectation of compensation"228 which can-
not be overcome by the fact that they were aware of the Commission's inten-
tion to comply with its duties. Even if the Nollans "had no expectation that they
could obtain approval of their new development and exercise any right of ex-
clusion afterward," 22 9 this does not mean that they did not expect to be com-
pensated for the taking of that right.
VI. CONCLUSION
Nollan provides a principled basis for determining when conditions imposed
for purposes of land-use regulation go so far that they cannot be sustained by
the police power alone but require the use of the eminent domain power as well.
Governing authorities are free to impose conditions upon the use of property,
including conditions resulting in permanent physical occupation, so long as the
legitimate state interest served by the condition would also be served by a deni-
al of the request for which the condition is substituted. The Nollan approach
prevents nullification of the constitutional guarantee of just compensation un-
der the guise of land-use regulation, and the Court's use of heightened scrutiny
protects the traditional common-law expectation of compensation when the right
to exclude others is taken by government.
Pamela S. Gerity
228. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441.
229. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3159 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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